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Searcy, Arkansas 
THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS 
Why It Is Broken and How It Can Be Fixed 
1989 AMERICAN INCENTIVE SYSTEM 
CALENDAR--
A Daily Chronicle of Enterprise 
In a joint venture project with Louver 
Manufacturing Company (Lomanco) of Jacksonville, 
Arkansas, the Harding University Students in Free 
Enterprise Economics Team presents the 1989 
"AMERICAN INCENTIVE SYSTEM 
CALENDAR--A Daily Chronicle of Enterprise." 
The 1989 "AMERICAN INCENTIVE SYSTEM 
CALENDAR" offers 365 brief reminders of great 
enterprising events and relevant comments on the 
idea of freedom applied to the marketplace. It 
should hang on the walls of offices, factories and 
school rooms all over the country. A limited 
amount of copies are available for $2.00 to cover 
printing, postage and handling costs. 
STAYING ON TOP IS HARDER 
THAN GETTING ON TOP 
The Harding University Economics team will 
attempt to win its seventh first place trophy at the 
National Students in Free Enterprise Competition 
next summer. The university economics teams have 
won first place six times at the nationals which were 
started in 1978. Harding teams, the winningest in 
the country to date, were national runners-up in 
1978, 1983, 1986, and 1988. 
The 1989 team is composed of Ron Cook, Co-
Chairperson from Searcy, Arkansas; Gabrielle 
DeMatteis, Co-Chairperson from Richmond, 
Virginia; Drue DeMatteis from Richmond, Virginia; 
Jim Hull from Columbus, Ohio; Karen Norwood 
from Searcy, Arkansas; Sheila Wood from 
Mabelvale, Arkansas; and their sponsor, Dr. Don 
Diffine, Professor of Economics and Director of the 
student-staffed Belden Center for Private Enterprise 
Education. 
by 
James D. Gwartney and Richard E. Wagner 
Every president elected during the last two decades has 
promised to bring federal spending under control and 
reduce the size of the budget deficit. All have failed, in 
both tasks. Between 1965 and 1985, federal expenditures 
as a share of GNP rose from 17.6 percent to 24.0 
percent. The non-defense component of federal spending 
expanded even more rapidly, soaring from 10.1 percent 
of GNP in 1%5 to 17.6 percent in 1985. Since 1960 the 
federal budget has been in deficit 26 out of the 27 years. 
By way of comparison, during the 1947-1960 period, there 
were seven budget surpluses and seven budget deficits. 
The budget process reached new lows in the 1980s. 
The annual charade goes along the following lines. The 
President submits a budget that includes a large deficit. 
After numerous committee hearings and much shadow 
boxing, Congress eventually passes a budget resolution 
specifying broad categories of spending. After the budget 
resolution is passed, separate committees on 
appropriations and revenue hammer out specific items in 
the budget. Theoretically, a congressional rule bars floor 
consideration of appropriations beyond the amount 
specified in the budget resolution; but everybody knows 
this is a paper lock. 
After all, the House has waived this rule nearly 500 
times during the decade. The time clock continues to 
tick. Before the appropriation bills are passed the new 
fiscal year begins. At the last minute, a continuing 
resolution is passed in order to keep the government 
from closing down. This borrows a little time. A couple 
of months after the fiscal year has started, Congress 
eventually passes a gigantic appropriations bill (last year's 
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bill was 1194 pages long) lined with lots of lard 
benefitting key senators and representatives in positions 
of power. The president must either sign the bill or close 
down the government. 
All through this process, politicians from both parties 
are on television telling us how they are struggling to 
control the budget deficit without cutting into the muscle 
of vital government programs. However, closer 
inspection reveals that this tale of struggle is a total 
misrepresentation of reality. 
The many bizarre items in recent budgets undermine 
the credibility of the tale. A North Dakota senator 
inserts a $10 million sunflower subsidy program for 
growers in his state. A Maryland congressman arranges 
for $200,000 to be paid to the City of Frederick for a 
ransom it paid to Confederate forces in 1864. A 
Nebraska representative pushes through a $20 million 
study to see if residents in his district qualified for 
disaster relief. During the waning hours prior to the 
passage of this year's budget, Senator Daniel Inouye of 
Hawaii even sneaked in $8 million to build a school in 
France for Jewish refugees. 
These are small items when looked at individually. But 
they are illustrative of the larger problem: the federal 
government's budget process lends itself to inclusion of 
spending measures which promote private interests and 
the political welfare of legislators at the expense of the 
general taxpayer. 
WHY THE CURRENT BUDGET PROCESS 
IS NOT WORKING 
Effective decisionmaking processes must confront those 
who make choices with incentives that encourage them to 
use resources wisely. Such processes must acknowledge 
explicitly that choices inescapably entail costs: to choose 
one thing necessarily entails the sacrifice of some valued 
alternative. Rational choice is possible only when those 
who make choices are confronted with a constraint that 
forces them to consider the cost of each option while 
seeking to choose the option that provides the most 
satisfaction. 
The current budgetary process is not working precisely 
because it does not force our legislators to make wise 
choices. There are four major reasons why this is so. 
1. The current budget process blurs costs and thereby 
makes it difficult to compare benefits relative to costs on 
a program-by-program basis. A decision to adopt a 
program is decided independently from a decision to levy 
taxes to fund the program. Worse still, Congress decides 
if a program should be adopted before it deals with the 
funding issue. Rather than deciding how much to spend 
and then choosing possible options within the budget 
constraint, Congress decides which programs to adopt 
and then tries to figure out how to finance them. Of 
course, this is precisely the reverse of what we do in the 
business and household sectors. In the private sector, 
we estimate the resources available during a budget 
period and then choose how best to allocate them. 
2. Under current rules, the federal budget constraint 
is soft. In their personal choices, people confront a 
relatively firm budget constraint. If households continue 
to spend beyond their means, their eventual inability to 
pay their bills and the accompanying loss of credit 
worthiness will impose a reality check. Similarly, if 
businesses consistently spend beyond their revenues, 
losses will result, stock value will decline, and, if 
necessary, bankruptcy will eventually terminate the 
profligacy. 
The current budget process of the federal government 
contrasts sharply with that of the private sector, in that 
the persons (legislators) making choices confront a much 
softer budget constraint. This is not to deny that a 
budget constraint ultimately exists, for it surely does. An 
increase in federal spending on one program must imply 
either a decrease in spending on other programs or an 
increase in taxes or borrowing--which in turn will require 
a decrease in personal spending. But the constraint is 
faced only indirectly and remotely within the federal 
government's budget process, whereas it is direct and 
immediate in personal choices. 
3. The current budget process plays into the hands of 
interest groups seeking private gain at public expense. 
Our first two points dealt with the general reduction in 
rationality that arises because there is no simultaneous 
consideration of the benefits and costs of public 
programs. Even if everyone had the same interests and 
evaluations concerning different possible spending 
programs, the budgetary process would be flawed 
because of its failure to support rational consideration of 
budgetary options. As a result people will support larger 
public spending than they would support if they had to 
confront directly the full cost of that spending. 
It is easy to see why the current process favors special 
interest groups. Since their personal stake is large, 
members of the interest group (and their representatives) 
have a strong incentive to inform themselves and their 
allies and to let legislators know how strongly they feel 
about an issue of special importance. Many of them will 
vote for or against candidates strictly on the basis of 
whether they support their interests. In addition, such 
interest groups are generally an attractive source of 
campaign resources, including financial contributions. In 
contrast, most other voters will care little about a special 
interest issue. For the non-special interest voter, the 
time and energy necessary to examine the issue will 
generally exceed any possible personal gain from a 
preferred resolution. Thus, most non-special interest 
voters will simply ignore such issues. 
4. The current budget process promotes the transfer 
of resources from production into rent seeking. Modern 
public choice theory refers to actions designed to 
promote one's interest at the expense of others as rent 
seeking. Rather than trying to build that proverbial 
better mousetrap, people might lobby for tariffs or quotas 
on imports, they might lobby a safety commission to ban 
lower cost, competitive mousetraps, or they might lobby 
to prevent people from making mousetraps at home. 
Rather than applying resources to the creation of wealth, 
rent seeking uses resources to redistribute previously 
created wealth. 
A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 
THAT WOULD MITIGATE 
THE PROBLEM 
The federal government must return to fiscal 
responsibility. There can be little doubt about this. But 
it would be a mistake to think that all we need is more 
budgetary tinkering by the legislature. To the extent our 
budgetary problems , are symptomatic of an underlying 
erosion of constitutional limitations on congressional 
budgetary authority, effective remedy would seem to 
require not still more legislation but a reassertion of 
constitutional control over legislative authority. 
The case for constitutional reformation rests on a 
recognition that there are situations in which even though 
people's pursuit of their own interests will lead to 
generally undesirable outcomes, individually they will 
have little incentive to act differently because to do so 
would leave them even worse off. Ordinary legislative 
processes will not restrain the budgetary excesses that 
arise from within a system of unlimited democracy, 
because legislators are merely exploiting the opportunities 
that existing constitutional rules offer. Better outcomes 
require alternative constitutional rules that foreclose 
some of the natural excesses of a system of majoritarian 
democracy. 
What changes in budgetary procedures would bring the 
self-interest of the political players more closely into 
harmony with the general welfare? There are several 
specific actions that would move us in that direction. We 
should like to outline the structure of a comprehensive 
reform in budget procedures that would do much to 
alleviate the major deficiencies of the current process. 
We do this not out of any sense that this is the only way 
to accomplish budgetary reform, but out of a recognition 
that it is necessary to get into some examination of 
specifics in order to advance the discussion of budgetary 
reform. We refer to this proposal as the Taxpayer 
Protection Amendment. There are five provisions of this 
amendment. 
1. A two-thirds Congressional majority would be 
required for approval of an increase in either taxes or 
debt. The main impact of this provision would be to 
curtail the scope for rent seeking, which in turn is the 
contemporary equivalent of what James Madison called 
the "violence of faction" in Federalist No. 10. The more 
inclusive the degree of consent that is required to enact 
budgetary measures, the less is the scope for winning 
factions to enact appropriations levels that they would not 
support if they had to bear the cost themselves, but 
would be only too happy to enact if they can place the 
burden of payment on someone else. 
2. Prior to the passage of any appropriation bill and 
at least five months before the beginning of each fiscal 
year, Congress and the President would be required to 
set a constraint for the level of fiscal year spending. 
Once the spending level constraint is passed, any 
spending beyond the limit would require the approval of 
a three-fourths majority of both houses. The President 
would be required to submit a proposed budget 
constraint figure to Congress at least eight months prior 
to the beginning of the fiscal year. In order to assure 
compliance, the President and each member of Congress 
would be fined $5,000 per day if the budget constraint 
was not passed within the required time limit. 
3. Two-thirds approval of both houses would be 
required for passage of any legislation that mandates 
spending by states, private businesses or individuals. 
This provision is necessary in order to prevent 
Congressional use of mandated expenditures as a means 
of escaping the limits imposed by the budget constraint. 
After all, whether the federal government spends $1 
billion on a program to subsidize prescription drug 
purchases for the elderly or, alternatively, requires states 
to set up such programs as a condition for continuing to 
receive highway aid the federal government is having an 
identical economic impact. Restricting the ability of the 
federal government to directly subsidize particular 
citizens at general expense will lead naturally to a search 
for indirect ways of doing the same thing. 
4. Any new program requiring a budget expenditure 
must simultaneously provide for a new source of revenue 
(additional taxes or user charges) which will finance the 
program. This requirement of a "marginally balanced 
budget" will assure that all new spending programs 
consider the cost, as well as the benefits, as part of a 
single package. This linking of benefits and costs when 
a program is considered will provide public sector 
decision-makers with an incentive structure more 
consistent with that of the private sector. Most assuredly 
it will result in more careful consideration of spending 
proposals and sounder public sector decisionmaking than 
the current process. 
5. Finally, an item-reduction veto should be given to 
the President. Note that we have said "item-reduction 
veto" and not "item veto" or "line-item veto." The 
President pretty much had an item veto prior to the 
Congressional Budget and lmpoundmcnt Act of 1974, in 
that he could impound spending on specific projects. 
Forty-three governors presently have item veto authority, 
and it might seem that such an authority would be an 
effective device for curbing budgetary excesses. However, 
the situation is a little more complex than this, which 
makes it important to distinguish between an item veto, 
in which the executive can either accept or veto a 
particular item and an item-reduction veto, in which the 
executive can also insert a lower figure without vetoing 
the item entirely. 
CONCLUSION 
A budget process consistent with economic efficiency is 
more dependent upon our ability to develop and institute 
sound rules and procedures than it is upon our ability to 
elect "better" people to political office. Unless we get the 
rules right, the political process will continue to be 
characterized by special interest legislation, bureaucratic 
inefficiency and the waste of rent seeking. 
The political incentive structure is like the law of 
gravity. Just as Republicans and Democrats both fall at 
32 feet per second squared, so too do both engage in 
special interest politics and other socially wasteful 
political behavior when the political incentive structure 
encourages them to do so. 
Taken as a package, the Taxpayer Protection 
Amendment would reduce the power of special interests, 
the attractiveness of rent seeking and the centralization 
of power toward Washington. In a more general context, 
it would be a modest step toward restoration of 
government based on agreement and mutual gain, rather 
than majority rule and the power to plunder. No doubt, 
many will feel that a reform of the type suggested here is 
unrealistic because its passage would require the support 
of persons in positions of political power. 
However, this obstacle may be more apparent than real. 
The current system more or less forces politicians to 
abuse their electoral reponsibility--to seize funds from 
taxpayers in order to provide political favors to organize 
interest groups in exchange for political support. How 
many legislators really want to be bagmen for special 
interest groups? If they are provided an option, a 
surprising number might well be supportive. 
The intellectual folly of our age is the view that 
democratic elections are all that is necessary for the 
preservation of personal liberty. History teaches that this 
view is false. The ordinary political process must be 
restrained. Constitutional rules based on the mutual 
agreement must be instituted and followed. 
Unless we begin to recognize the folly of the "everything 
is up for grabs" conceptualization of government, 
increasing factionalism and growing dissatisfaction with 
the results of public policy are in the offing, as Madison 
warned in Federalist No. 10. Now is the time to learn 
or, more accurately, to relearn the merits of a political 
economy based on principles and rules of mutual 
agreement. The freedom and prosperity of America are 
dependent upon our ability to do so. 
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